Risks in Synthetic Biology / Key Biosecurity Vocabulary
A large risk in synthetic biology is technology that can be used for both good and bad — so called dual use. An example of this are vaccines that could also be used as bioweapons. It’s crucial that ethical concerns are considered early in the process. If the downside of the research is too large it might be wise to wait until there is a way to decrease the risk of it falling into the wrong hands. [1]
Information hazards are similar to the dual use dilemma. It’s exactly what it sounds like — information which could be used to harm for instance by bioterrorists. The unilateralists curse makes this extra harmful since information in the hands of a bad actor is enough to create harmful effects even though all other actors are using the information responsibly. [2]
GCBRs are biological risks of a massive scale. Imagine a pandemic which wipes out civilization and the future of humanity. With faster development of engineering in synthetic biology, it is not unimaginable that something like this could be created. [3]
Bioweapons are weapons made with biology for instance smallpox has been weaponized in the past. [4] Using bioweapons in war is considered a war crime. [5]
Gain-of-function research in biotechnology is about making pathogens more transmissible or more dangerous. [6] This ties together with information hazard since that information can be used for both good and bad purposes for updating vaccines against new variants of covid or making a bioweapon.
Gene drives are genetic elements which make sure that more than half of the offspring inherits certain genes. This has been most debated for malaria mosquitos. There are many ethical implications, especially on ecosystems. [7]
Safeguarding from Synbio Risks
Surveillance of emerging pathogens which could cause new pandemics is important in order to be able to take action, use protective measures to contain the spread and develop vaccines as fast as possible. An example of this is using metagenomics to screen wastewater and look for spikes in new unknown DNA. [8]
Vaccine technology is a great tool for protecting people against harmful effects and reaching immunity as quickly as possible. The idea is to give the immune system a small non-harmful piece of the pathogen to practice on so that it doesn’t get sick when exposed to it.
Technology design is important to consider in terms of information hazards and dual use. The key is to not create incentives for bad actors, as well as decreasing the ways it can be used for harmful purposes. An example of this would be to screen DNA orders for harmful sequences before synthesizing and selling them. [9]
Policy and global cooperation increases the likelihood of standard practices and legislation. Since pathogens don’t understand borders, cooperation is non negotiable for managing outbreaks.
Personal protective equipment such as face masks or rubber gloves is a great way to protect yourself and others from both chemicals and potentially harmful toxins or organisms.
Safety in our project
We had two incidents of covid in our team and the affected students chose to stay home to protect others from an infection. Our policy in case of illness indicated to stay at home and recover.
Depending on what was most safe and suitable, we used open benches, fume hoods or biosafety cabinets. For instance, when handling potential carcinogens such as s-acrylamide, we used personal protective equipment under a fume hood. Our work with E. coli was conducted in a standard microbiological lab with security level one. For the HEK cells, a level two lab was used in order to get moderate containment.
Since we were working with synthetic organisms with antibiotic resistance genes, we adopted appropriate methods of containment and disposal. These genes could pose a risk for furthering antibiotic resistance in harmful pathogens.
Safe Lab work
As guidance we used the rules from the universities where we did our lab work: Karolinska Institute and KTH Royal Institute of Technology, as well as The Public Health Agency of Sweden.
Safety and security training about topics:
Lab access and rules
Responsible individuals
Differences between biosafety levels
Biosafety equipment
Good microbial technique
Disinfection and sterilization
Emergency procedures
Rules for transporting samples between labs or shipping between institutions
Physical biosecurity
Personnel biosecurity
Data biosecurity / cyberbiosecurity
Chemical, fire and electrical safety
Implemented measures:
Accident reporting
Personal Protective Equipment
Inventory controls
Physical access controls
Data access controls
Waste management system
Additional containment
Project-specific safety or security training
Consulting with other experts about managing risks
Consulting with iGEM about managing risks
Safe Project Design
To the best of our knowledge, the parts and organisms were relatively low risk. For the HEK cells which weren’t on the white list, we submitted a check in form. HEK cells belong to risk group two and could potentially be a hazard to immunodeficient individuals since the genome contains Adenovirus 5 DNA. For this we used BSL2 containment, sterile techniques, a special safety introduction from the department expert and supervision.
We have not experienced any accidental release from the designated areas. While working, we were mindful of the security training and the implemented measures to minimize such risks. Since we believe our institution is sufficient at managing risks, we did not bring in external risk experts. For future clinical trials of our product, we will contact external experts to assess risks of large scale production of recombinant proteins and concerns related to drug approval.
References
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A. C. Bhowmik
Dual-Use in Synthetic Biology: Balancing Intellectual Freedom with Regulations on Research
Stanford Journal of Public Health, vol. 6, 2017
Read it
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A. C. Nieuwenweg, B. D. Trump, K. Klasa, D. A. Bleijs, and K. A. Oye
Emerging Biotechnology and Information Hazards
NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security. Springer, pp 131-140, 2021
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-024-2086-9_9
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Toby Ord
The Precipice
The Precipice
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K. Alibek
Smallpox: a disease and a weapon
International Journal of Infectious Diseases, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 3-8, 2004
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijid.2004.09.004
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J. GoldWat
The Biological Weapons Convention: An overview
International Review of the Red Cross (1961 - 1997), vol. 37, no. 318, pp. 251-265, 1997
DOI: 10.1017/S0020860400084679
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National Academics Press (US)
Gain-of-Function Research: Background and Alternatives
Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop, 2015
Read it
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K. L. Warmbrod, A. Kobokovich, R. West, G. Ray, M. Trotochaud, and M. Montague
New Report from Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security: Gene Drives: Pursuing Opportunities, Minimizing Risk
Center News, 2020
Read it
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The Nucleic Acid Observatory Consortium
A Global Nucleic Acid Observatory for Biodefense and Planetary Health
Cornell University, 2021
Read it
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C. R. Isaac
Establishing an incentive-based multistakeholder approach to dual-use DNA screening
Biochem Cell Biol., vol. 100, no. 3, pp. 268-273, 2022
DOI: 10.1139/bcb-2021-0504